Files
IdeaSDK/crates/infrastructure/src/permission/codex.rs
Blomios 287681c198 feat(orchestrator): modèle de désignation d'orchestrateur + sink de diagnostic
Introduit le modèle AgentManifest { version, entries, orchestrator } et la
garde d'écriture directe may_write_directly(..., &OrchestratorDesignation) :
seul l'orchestrateur désigné peut écrire directement, les autres passent par
le rendez-vous médié. Câble la désignation à travers domain → application →
infrastructure → app-tauri (context_guard, service, lifecycle, ports).

Ajoute crates/application/src/diag.rs : sink de diagnostic best-effort, sans
dépendance, qui miroite les traces du rendez-vous inter-agents de
l'orchestrateur vers un fichier de log persistant (utile au lancement via
AppImage où stderr est jeté), avec la même discipline « zéro dépendance,
ne casse jamais le rendez-vous ».

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-20 08:56:39 +02:00

214 lines
8.2 KiB
Rust

//! Codex CLI permission projector (lot LP3-2).
//!
//! Produces the **permission-relevant** part of Codex's `config.toml`
//! (`sandbox_mode` / `approval_policy`) plus the matching launch args
//! (`--sandbox` / `--ask-for-approval`) and, for workspace-write postures, the
//! project root as an additional writable directory (`--add-dir`). The
//! posture→mode derivation is extracted verbatim from the former
//! `codex_sandbox_mode` / `codex_approval_policy` / `apply_codex_cli_permission_args`
//! in `lifecycle.rs`.
//!
//! Unlike Claude's seed, Codex's `config.toml` is **co-owned** (it also carries the
//! `mcp_servers.idea` table and the `projects.*` trust entries, which are MCP/trust
//! concerns, not permissions). The projector therefore emits a
//! [`ProjectedFile::MergeToml`] limited to the two permission keys it manages —
//! everything else in the file is preserved by the fold, and the file is **never**
//! deleted on swap (hence an empty `owned_replace_paths`).
use domain::permission::{
EffectivePermissions, PermissionProjection, PermissionProjector, Posture, ProjectedFile,
ProjectionContext, ProjectorKey,
};
use super::toml_string;
/// Run-dir-relative path of Codex's `config.toml`. Codex reads its config from
/// `$CODEX_HOME/config.toml`; IdeA isolates `CODEX_HOME` to `{runDir}/.codex`, so
/// the file lives at `.codex/config.toml` relative to the run dir.
const CONFIG_REL_PATH: &str = ".codex/config.toml";
/// The two top-level keys this projector manages in `config.toml`. Everything else
/// (MCP table, trust entries, user keys) is preserved by the merge.
const MANAGED_KEYS: [&str; 2] = ["sandbox_mode", "approval_policy"];
/// Projects [`EffectivePermissions`] into Codex's sandbox/approval config + args.
///
/// Pure: `project` only computes the plan; the launch path merges the TOML fragment
/// and appends the args.
#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct CodexPermissionProjector;
impl PermissionProjector for CodexPermissionProjector {
fn key(&self) -> ProjectorKey {
ProjectorKey::Codex
}
fn project(
&self,
eff: Option<&EffectivePermissions>,
ctx: &ProjectionContext,
) -> PermissionProjection {
// Product invariant: nothing posed ⇒ nothing projected. Codex keeps its
// native sandbox/approval defaults (no args, no managed keys written).
let Some(permissions) = eff else {
return PermissionProjection::empty();
};
let sandbox = codex_sandbox_mode(permissions);
let approval = codex_approval_policy(permissions);
// Permission-only TOML fragment (escaped exactly like the former
// `set_top_level_toml_value`). The mcp_servers/trust tables are NOT a
// permission concern and stay with the MCP wiring (LP3-3).
let contents = format!(
"sandbox_mode = {}\napproval_policy = {}\n",
toml_string(sandbox),
toml_string(approval),
);
let mut args = vec![
"--sandbox".to_owned(),
sandbox.to_owned(),
"--ask-for-approval".to_owned(),
approval.to_owned(),
];
if sandbox == "workspace-write" && !ctx.project_root.is_empty() {
args.push("--add-dir".to_owned());
args.push(ctx.project_root.to_owned());
}
PermissionProjection {
files: vec![ProjectedFile::MergeToml {
rel_path: CONFIG_REL_PATH.to_owned(),
managed_tables: Vec::new(),
managed_keys: MANAGED_KEYS.iter().map(|k| (*k).to_owned()).collect(),
contents,
}],
args,
env: Vec::new(),
}
}
fn owned_replace_paths(&self) -> Vec<String> {
// config.toml is co-owned (MergeToml), never an owned Replace file.
Vec::new()
}
}
fn codex_sandbox_mode(permissions: &EffectivePermissions) -> &'static str {
match permissions.fallback() {
Posture::Deny => "read-only",
Posture::Ask | Posture::Allow => "workspace-write",
}
}
fn codex_approval_policy(permissions: &EffectivePermissions) -> &'static str {
match permissions.fallback() {
Posture::Allow => "never",
Posture::Ask | Posture::Deny => "on-request",
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use domain::permission::{resolve, PermissionSet};
fn ctx<'a>() -> ProjectionContext<'a> {
ProjectionContext {
project_root: "/proj",
run_dir: "/run/agent",
}
}
/// Builds an [`EffectivePermissions`] with the given fallback posture via the
/// domain API (only the fallback drives Codex's sandbox/approval derivation).
fn eff(fallback: Posture) -> EffectivePermissions {
resolve(Some(&PermissionSet::new(vec![], fallback)), None).unwrap()
}
// ---- product invariant + ownership ----------------------------------
#[test]
fn project_none_is_empty() {
let proj = CodexPermissionProjector.project(None, &ctx());
assert!(proj.files.is_empty());
assert!(proj.args.is_empty());
assert!(proj.env.is_empty());
}
#[test]
fn owned_replace_paths_is_empty() {
// config.toml is co-owned (MergeToml) ⇒ nothing to clean up on swap.
assert!(CodexPermissionProjector.owned_replace_paths().is_empty());
}
// ---- (6) posture → sandbox_mode / approval_policy + (7) args↔contents
// coherence + add-dir + MergeToml shape ---------------------
#[test]
fn posture_maps_sandbox_and_approval_in_file_and_args() {
for (posture, sandbox, approval) in [
(Posture::Deny, "read-only", "on-request"),
(Posture::Ask, "workspace-write", "on-request"),
(Posture::Allow, "workspace-write", "never"),
] {
let proj = CodexPermissionProjector.project(Some(&eff(posture)), &ctx());
assert!(proj.env.is_empty(), "Codex projection carries no env");
// -- The single MergeToml file, with the two managed permission keys.
assert_eq!(proj.files.len(), 1, "exactly one file projected");
match &proj.files[0] {
ProjectedFile::MergeToml {
rel_path,
managed_tables,
managed_keys,
contents,
} => {
assert_eq!(rel_path, CONFIG_REL_PATH);
assert!(managed_tables.is_empty(), "no managed tables");
assert_eq!(
managed_keys,
&vec!["sandbox_mode".to_owned(), "approval_policy".to_owned()]
);
assert!(
contents.contains(&format!("sandbox_mode = \"{sandbox}\"")),
"posture {posture:?}: contents={contents:?}"
);
assert!(
contents.contains(&format!("approval_policy = \"{approval}\"")),
"posture {posture:?}: contents={contents:?}"
);
}
ProjectedFile::Replace { .. } => panic!("Codex must emit a MergeToml file"),
}
// -- (7) Args reflect the SAME values as the TOML, in CLI order.
assert_eq!(
&proj.args[..4],
vec![
"--sandbox".to_owned(),
sandbox.to_owned(),
"--ask-for-approval".to_owned(),
approval.to_owned(),
],
"posture {posture:?}: args must mirror the TOML values"
);
if sandbox == "workspace-write" {
assert!(
proj.args
.windows(2)
.any(|w| w == ["--add-dir".to_owned(), "/proj".to_owned()]),
"workspace-write posture must add the project root as writable: {:?}",
proj.args
);
} else {
assert!(
!proj.args.contains(&"--add-dir".to_owned()),
"read-only posture must not add writable dirs: {:?}",
proj.args
);
}
}
}
}